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BUSTOS v. MITCHELL (SAXBE v. BUSTOS*): THE
DILEMMA OF COMMUTING ALIEN LABORERS
Almost daily, this country's labor force is flooded with over
55,000 aliens who enter the United States from Mexico and Can-
* As this issue proceeded into the final stages of publication, the United
States Supreme Court decided Saxbe v. Bustos and the companion case, Cardona
v. Saxbe. Saxbe v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1974);
Cardona v. Saxbe, No. 73-480 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1974). In a 5 to
4 decision, the court upheld the right to entry for both seasonal and daily
commuting laborers. The holding was primarily concerned with the issue of
whether congressional acquiescence and administrative practice may overcome
the plain language of the federal statute. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Douglas, joined in by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Rehnquist, gave great weight to the fact that Congress has not acted to
change the commuter practice. In reference to the apparent conflicts between the
immigration law and the alien commuter program, Justice Douglas stated, "Such
a history of administrative construction and congressional acquiescence may add
a gloss or qualification to what is on its face unqualified statutory language."
Id., at 9.
Furthermore, the court was unwilling to accept the distinction drawn by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals between daily commuters and seasonal
commuters. Justice Douglas wrote, "We would have read the same language
in two opposed ways to sanction the daily commuter and strike down the sea-
sonal commuter program." Id., at 14.
In addition to the attention given to the long history of commuter prac-
tice, the majority was influenced by the political, economic, and social implica-
tions that would result from a decision to ban alien commuters. The court
cited the estimate of the United States Commission on Civil Rights that if the
Mexican commuters were cut off, they would lose $50,000,000 annually. Also,
250,000 family members who depend on the income earned by commuters would
lose their means of support. It is thought that these aliens account for 25% to
30% of the income earned by the labor force in some Mexican border com-
munities. Id., at 13.
The majority also gave great weight to the fact that termination of the
alien commuter practice might force those Mexicans who are lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in this country to actually move to this country. Id., at 14.
It is clear that such an occurrence would create problems of housing and education
in this country's border towns.
The majority concluded that "The changes suggested implicate so many
problems of a political, economic, and social nature that it is fit that the judiciary
recuse itself." Id., at 14. For these reasons, the majority upheld the present
criteria for admission of both daily and seasonal commuter aliens.
The minority in Bustos refused to be swayed by the historical longevity of
the commuter practice. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
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ada to work in the industries and agricultural areas of various
American border communities.1 Many of these laborers come
to this country each work day and return to their foreign resi-
dences at night. Others, particularly farm workers, remain here
for months, taking employment wherever agricultural jobs are
available. Although these aliens differ in terms of the duration
of their visits, they all possess three common characteristics.
First, they originally came to the United States as immigrants law-
fully admitted for permanent residence in the United States.'
Blackmun, urged that "[a]dministrative construction over a long period of time
is an available tool for judicial interpretation of a statute only when the statutory
terms are doubtful or ambiguous." Id., dissenting opinion at 1. Furthermore,
the minority argued that congressional silence standing alone cannot constitute
acceptance of a continuing administrative practice.
The four-man minority contended that neither the daily nor the seasonal
commuter were properly admissible under the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Employing logic similar to that set forth in this note, they
concluded that neither class of commuter qualifies as a United States resident as
defined in section 101(a)(33) of the 1952 Act. Thus, these aliens are not
exempt from the entry documentation requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b) and
would be subject to the labor certification process of section 212(a)(14) of the
1965 Amendments to the 1952 Act.
As stated throughout the text of this note, the alien commuter practice simply
does not conform to the plain language of the relevant immigration laws. It is
clear from both opinions that, under the federal statutes, there should be no
differentiation between daily and seasonal commuting aliens. The problem,
however, is that the majority refuses to interpret the statute in accord with its
clear language, since to do so would have social, political, and economic implica-
tions. Neither these implications nor the historical longevity of the practice
should force the Court to avoid the plain language of the federal statute involved.
It is the sole prerogative of the legislature to take such extrinsic factors into
consideration. To quote Justice White's minority opinion, "Because I believe
that the Court has strayed from the neutral judicial function of applying tradi-
tional principles of statutory construction, I must dissent." Id., dissenting opinion
at 10. It is the final conclusion of this note that Justice White is correct in his
analysis and the legislature should now exercise its proper function and resolve
this dilemma.
1. Brief for Appellees at 3, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973). This figure is based on records of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service as of April 30, 1972, which break down as follows: Seasonal commuters
from Mexico, 8,283; daily commuters from Mexico, 47,174; total commuters from
Canada 8,514. In contrast, the California Farm Bureau has estimated that there
are approximately 150,000 seasonal commuters working in California agriculture.
The Farm Bureau arrived at this figure based on an extrapolation of a survey
taken at four representative California farms. California Farm Bureau Federation
As Amicus Curiae, Richardson v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Sept. 7,
1973).
2. Brief for Appellees at 2, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Stipulation, Bustos v. Mitchell, reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 34-
35, Richardson v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 1973).
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Second, none of them maintain actual permanent residences in
this country.3 Third, they are allowed to enter the United States
by presenting only the Alien Registration Identification Cards
(commonly known as green cards) which they received when they
were admitted for permanent United States residence.4
Thus, by working in this country and residing in Mexico or
Canada, these commuters are able to earn higher wages than pos-
sible in their native countries, and avoid the greater living ex-
penses found in the United States. 5 Since these foreigners re-
quire less money to maintain themselves in Mexico and Canada,
they are frequently willing to work for wages below those accept-
able to American residents.6 It is well documented that this sit-
uation contributes to the overall depressed economic and working
conditions in America's border areas. 7 Consequently, for the past
decade American labor organizations have been attempting to en-
join the admission of commuting workers into this country. As
will be shown, the history of these attempts is dominated by a re-
luctance on the part of the courts to disturb this long continued
practice.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Bustos v. Mitchell 8 marks the most
successful challenge to the commuter system. Bustos involved an
attack by American farm workers, permanent resident alien farm
workers, and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee
from California against the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice's practice of permitting Mexican aliens to commute daily or
3. Daily commuters are defined by the Board of Immigration and Naturali-
zation Appeals as "persons who have their place of residence in foreign contiguous
territory and commute daily to the United States to work." In the Matter of L_,
4 I. & N. Dec. 454, 455 (1951). The seasonal commuter has been defined by
the Immigration Service in their responses to the Senate Subcommittee on Migra-
tory Labor as "an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent resi-
dence, who resides in a contiguous foreign country, who comes to the United
States solely to perform seasonal work for extended periods." Hearings entitled
"Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness" before the Subcomm. on Mi-
gratory Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare of the U.S. Senate,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. pt. 5-A, at 2022 (1970).
4. Brief for Appellees at 2, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Stipulation, reprinted in Petition for Certiorari at 34-35, Richardson v.
Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 1973).
5. Department of Labor, The "Commuter Problem" and Low Wages and
Unemployment in American Cities on the Mexican Border, REPORT OF THE SE-
LECT COMMISSION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION, at 113 (1968).
6. Id., at 126.
7. Id., at 116, 127, 128.
8. 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Vol. 5
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seasonably to employment, regardless of any adverse effect they
may have on wages or working conditions in this country. In its
decision, the Bustos court chose not to disturb the daily commuter
system, which includes nearly eighty-five percent of the 'total com-
muting work force. 9 Nevertheless, the court struck down the
practice of allowing seasonal workers to enter this country by util-
izing only their alien registration receipt cards on two grounds.
First, it found that seasonal commuters are not returning resident
aliens, and thus are not exempt from the requirement that immi-
grant aliens obtain immigrant visas prior to coming into the United
States.'" Second, the court decided -that seasonal commuters are
properly considered as being nonimmigrants," and for this rea-
son their entry must be preceded by a showing that there are not
unemployed persons capable of performing such labor -to be found
in this country. As it will be seen, it is almost impossible for the
seasonal farm worker to obtain entry documentation as either an
immigrant or nonimmigrant. So, by prohibiting the seasonal com-
muter's use of his green card as documentation for reentry into
the United States, the court in Bustos v. Mitchell would in effect
close the gates at our borders to the alien seasonal farm workers.
The decision in Bustos, however, is in direct conflict with the
1970 ruling handed down by the Ninth Circuit in Gooch v.
Clark.'2 In Gooch, the court upheld the legality of both the daily
and seasonal commuter practices. In order to resolve this conflict,
the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari' 3 to the
Bustos case and will hear argument during the October term of
1974. This article will be primarily an analysis of the arguments
presented by both sides in the controversy. The conclusion drawn
will be based almost exclusively on the strict interpretation of the
language of the statutes in question. It is fairly well established
that an arbitrary decision to exclude alien commuters would have
widespread economic and political ramifications on both sides of
the border. 14 However, -this article will suggest only what the Su-
9. Brief for Appellees at 3, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
10. 481 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11. Id.
12. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970).
13. Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 414
U.S. 1143 (1974).
14. For an expression of this conclusion, see the affidavit of former Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers, Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, at 38,
Richardson v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 14, 1973).
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preme Court's decision should be, as dictated by the plain lan-
guage of the statutory provisions governing immigration.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Bustos represents a
strong victory for American farm labor, but the court should have
expanded its judgment to remove the daily commuter from com-
petition with workers in this country. This contention is based
on the fact that many of the court's reasons for excluding the sea-
sonal commuter are equally applicable to the daily commuter.
Bustos v. Mitchell was decided on the strength of interpretations
given by -the court to a number of interrelated sections of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952, and the Code of Federal
Regulations. The appellants (referred to alternatively as the
United Farm Workers) contended that the language of these stat-
utes dictated the exclusion of all commuting farm workers from
the United States.' 5 Despite the Court's decision to ban only sea-
sonal commuters, they nevertheless employed the same logic pre-
sented in the United Farm Worker's arguments. The first part
of this note, therefore, shall present the Appellant United Farm
Worker's view of the disputed statutory provisions. Consideration
will then -turn to the court's decision not to exclude daily commut-
ing farm workers, a decision which was influenced primarily by
the fact that the practice had 'been in existence for over forty
years.'" This argument, as set forth by the government in Bustos,
will be analyzed within the context of a historical survey of the
commuter system. Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals
will be evaluated, and recommendations will be made that, to be
consistent, the Supreme Court should broaden the findings of the
Court of Appeals to also enjoin the daily commuter practice.
I. THE ISSUES IN BUSTOS V. MITCHELL
A. The Appellant's Arguments
1. The Immigrant Visa Requirement-The challenge to
the commuter system advanced by the appellants in Bustos was
threefold, although the court's published opinion addressed itself
to only the first two claims for relief.1 7  First, the United Farm
15. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481
F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief, Saxbe v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S.
Sup. Ct., April 19, 1974).
16. 481 F.2d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17. The Court did not discuss the question of whether 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)
(1) permits commuters to enter the country to take employment at a place where
a labor dispute exists even if they have been employed there previously.
Vol. -
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Workers contended that alien commuters must have a valid immi-
grant visa in order to enter the United States for work.18 An im-
migrant visa is good for four months, and is surrendered upon en-
try."' Immigrant aliens may not come into this country without
a valid immigrant visa, unless they are returning resident immi-
grants." This restriction on the admission of immigrants is em-
bodied in sections 211(a) and 211(b) of the 1965 Amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952:
211(a). Except as provided in subsection (b) no immigrant
shall -be admitted into the United States unless at
the time of application for admission he has a valid
unexpired immigrant visa or was born subsequent
to the issuance of such a visa to the 'accompanying
parent.
211(b). Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 212(a)
(20) of this Act in such cases or in such classes of
cases and under such conditions as may be by reg-
'ulations prescribed, returning resident immigrants,
defined in Section 101(a)(27)(B), who are other-
wise admissible may be readmitted to the United
States by the Attorney General in his discretion
without being required to obtain a passport, immi-
grant visa, reentry permit or other documenta-
tion.21 (Emphasis added).
The implications of sections 211(a) and 211(b) are de-
pendent upon the interpretation given to the term returning resi-
dent immigrant under section 101(a)(27)(B) of the 1952 Act.
22
The United Farm Workers alleged that an alien commuter is not
a returning resident immigrant under this section,28 which defined
that alien as an immigrant lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence who is returning from a temporary visit abroad. They
maintained that the commuting laborer fails in two ways to meet
18. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 4, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 19, Saxbe v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct.,
April 19, 1974).
19. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 221(c), (e), 8 U.S.C. § 1201
(c), (e) (1970).
20. Id., § 211(a), (b), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a), (b) (1970).
21. Id.
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(27)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1I01(a)(27)(B) (1970).
23. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 7, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 20, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., April 19, 1974).
1974
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the requisites of section 101(a)(27)(B). First, the status of be-
ing lawfully admitted for permanent residence has been aban-
doned by the commuter due to his failure to establish a permanent
home in the United States.24 Indeed, section 101(a)(20) of the
1952 Act lends support to the appellants' contention. In this sec-
tion, the ensuing definition is given to the phrase lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence:
[T]he status of having been accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accord-
ance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed.25 (Emphasis added).
Hence, the appellants in Bustos reasoned that the permanent res-
ident status spoken of in section 101(a)(20) may terminate if the
immigrant fails to maintain a permanent residence in this coun-
try.
2 6
The second argument made by the United Farm Workers
was that the commuting alien is not returning from a temporary
visit abroad, and is not, therefore, within the proper construction
of returning resident immigrant in section 101 (a) (27) (B). 27
Under ordinary usage, the Mexican or Canadian commuter's daily
or seasonal visit to the United States cannot fairly be looked upon
as a return from a temporary visit abroad. Also, it must be noted
that under 8 C.F.R. 211.1(b)(2), an immigrant alien may use
his Alien Registration Card to enter the United States only if he
is returning to an unrelinquished lawful permanent residence in
the United States.28 As the appellants in Bustos maintained,
when 8 C.F.R. 211.1(b)(1) is considered together with section
211 (waiver of visa requirement to returning resident immi-
grants), it is clear that the commuter may not enter using only
his green card.29
24. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 7, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 30-36, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., April 19, 1974).
25. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(20) (1970).
26. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 11, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 30 et seq., Saxbe v. Bustos,
No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
27. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 11, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 36-40, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
28. 8C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1974).
29. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 7, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F 2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 37-40, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
Vol. 5
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Furthermore, it was urged that a construction of the expres-
sion returning resident immigrants in any fashion other than that
espoused by the appellants would blatantly contradict the mean-
ing given 'to the term residence in section 101(a)(33) of the
1952 Act: "the place of general abode; the place of general
abode of a person means his principal actual dwelling place with-
out regard to intent.
30
Since the Mexican laborers complained of by the ap-
pellants in Bustos are not United States residents with-
in the plain language of section 101(a)(33), it is appropriate
that they obtain immigrant visas prior to crossing into this country.
For the commuting agricultural worker, this restriction would
probably act as a complete bar to his admission. An immigrant
may not procure a visa to perform skilled or unskilled labor in
the United States, unless the Secretary of Labor has made a favor-
able labor certification, pursuant to section 212(a)(14) of the
1965 Amendments. 3  Under this section, it must be shown that
there are insufficient domestic workers to perform such labor, and
that the applicant's employment would not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of American laborers. The United
Farm Workers concluded that the farm labor supply in this coun-
try is sufficient and that the commuting agricultural worker should
not be admitted into the United States.
32
2. Commuters Are Properly Considered Nonimmigrants-
The second position advocated by the appellants was that alien
commuters who maintain their residences in a foreign country
should be reclassified as nonimmigrants.83 The United Farm
Workers stressed the fact that the commuting Mexican farm work-
ers originally represented to immigration authorities that they in-
tended to become permanent United States residents. For this
reason, they were not classified by the Immigration Service as
nonimmigrant aliens under section 101 (a) (15) (H) of the 1952
30. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(33), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(33) (1970).
31. Id., § 212(a)(14), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
32. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 6, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 19, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
33. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 10, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 85-90, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
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Immigration and Nationality Act. The 1952 legislation reads as
follows:
(15). The term "immigrant" means every alien except an
alien who is in one of the following classes of non-
immigrant aliens
(H). . . . ; or (ii) who is coming temporarily to the United
States to perform temporary services or labor, if tin-
employed persons capable of performing such service
or labor cannot be found in this country.
3 4
In order for an alien to enter this country to accept employ-
ment as a nonimmigrant, the prospective employer must show the
Secretary of Labor that he has made an effort to recruit laborers
locally, has offered specified wages, housing and other benefits,
and has abided by state and local labor, health, and housing laws. 5
The appellants concluded that since no shortage of farm labor
exists in the United States, it is not permissible to admit Mexican
residents for such employment."0 With the aforementioned fac-
tors in mind, the United Farm Workers asked that the United
States District Court reclassify commuter aliens as nonimmigrants
under section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the 1952 Act.
B. The Court's Decision to Ban Seasonal Commuters
The Bustos court concluded that seasonal commuters are not
exempt from the requirement that all immigrant aliens obtain im-
migrant visas prior to entering this country. Under section
211(b) of the 1965 Amendments, the waiver of the immigrant
visa is limited to returning resident immigrants. This immigrant
is defined in section 101(a) (27)(B) of the Act of 1952 as an
immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is re-
turning from a temporary visit abroad. In holding that seasonal
commuters failed to satisfy the criteria of this section, the court
went so far as to quote from the following dissent by Judge Wright
34. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(15)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1l01(a)(15)(H) (1970).
35. 29 C.F.R. §§ 60.2, 60.6 Schedule B (1973). The enabling legislation for
this regulation reads:
The question of importing any alien as a nonimmigrant under Section
101 (a)(15)(H) in any specific case shall be determined by the Attorney
General, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the government,
upon petition of the importing employer.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 211(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) (1970).
36. Supplemental Appendix to Brief for Appellants at 12, Bustos v. Mitchell,
481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Respondent's Brief at 18-19, Saxbe v. Bustos, No.
73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Aug. 19, 1974).
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in Gooch v. Clark:
[T]he majority's construction of "lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence" as including commuters makes nonsense
of the congressional policy embodied in no fewer than five
sections of the Act entirely apart from 1§ l101(a)(27)(B),
and is contrary to the plain meaning of two others.37
Further, the court determined that the language of 8 C.F.R.
211.1(b)(1), which limits the use of the green card as entry doc-
umentation to persons returning to an unrelinquished lawful per-
manent residence in the United States, does not include seasonal
commuters.3 8
Thus, the court's decision dictates that seasonal commuters
obtain immigrant visas before coming into this country. An immi-
grant visa may be obtained by an alien to perform labor only if
the Secretary of Labor finds that there are not sufficient workers
available to perform the labor, and that his employment will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of American
domestic workers.Y9 Since the seasonal commuters' adverse affect
on labor in this country has been fairly well established,40 the
holding of the court in Bustos should serve to exclude them from
the United States.
The Court of Appeals went even further, however, finding
that seasonal commuters should be classified as nonimmigrants
under section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the 1952 Act.41  As the de-
cision in Bustos states:
This provision reflects he intention of Congress in the Act
of 1952 to differentiate carefully between immigrants coming
to the United States for permanent residence and nonimmi-
grants coming temporarily.
42
Since the commuting seasonal worker is a nonimmigrant, his pro-
spective employer must demonstrate to the Secretary of Labor that
37. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74, 83 (9th Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 402 U.S.
995 (1971).
38. 481 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(14), as amended,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
40. See, e.g., Department of Labor, The "Commuter Problem" and Low
Wages and Unemployment in American Cities on the Mexican Border, in REPORT
OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE IMMIGRATION (1968).
See also, Note, Aliens in the Fields: The "Green Card Commuter" Under the
Immigration and Nationality Laws, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1750 (1969).
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he has been unable to recruit workers locally.4" If no such show-
ing can be made, then the seasonal commuter is banned from this
country.
C. The Government's Argument
The appellees in Bustos (hereinafter referred to alterna-
tively as the government) took a more conservative approach to
the questions involving the proper interpretations of sections
211(a) and (b), 101(a)(27), 101(a)(20), and 101(a)(33).
Rather than setting forth its own construction of the statutes as
the only possible view, the government seemed to assert that its
definitions are at least feasible, and supported its position
mostly with the fact of congressional accession to and judicial ap-
proval of the long established commuter practice. Since many of
its arguments were couched in terms of historical longevity of
the commuter system, the discussion of the government's claims
will take place within the context of a survey of the history of the
commuter program.
Prior to 1921, the commuter practice was to allow Mexi-
can and Canadian laborers to enter the United States to work free
of restriction, including the anti-contract labor section of the Im-
migration Act of 1917.11 Indeed, section 23 of the Act directed
the Commissioner of Immigration not to delay ordinary travel
across our border.4 5 It was pursuant to this section that immigra-
tion authorities prescribed an identification card for the benefit
of any persons who habitually crossed the border.
6
The Immigration Act of 1921 placed the first numerical limi-
tations on immigration to the United States, but provided exemp-
tions for persons from all countries who entered as temporary vis-
itors. 7 In addition, the 1921 Act, which had been designed to
lessen immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, 48 provided
no quota for workers entering the United States from Mexico or
Canada.4
This temporary legislation was replaced by the Immigration
Act of 1924, which created the immigrant and nonimmigrant cat-
43. 29 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1973).
44. Immigration and Nationality Act of February 5, 1917, § 3, 39 STAT.
875.
45. Id., § 23, 39 STAT. 892.
46. Immigration Laws and Rules of May 1, 1917, Rule 12(9), Rule 13(3).
47. Immigration Act of 1921, § 2(a)(4), 42 STAT. 5.
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egories of entering aliens, and required immigrants to obtain visas
prior to entering the United States. Immigrants were defined as
all entering aliens, with the exception of certain specified nonim-
migrants.5" This immigrant class was further divided into quota
and non-quota immigrants.51 Among the aliens included within
this non-quota category were: (1) natives of independent Western
Hemisphere countries, 2 and (2) an immigrant previously lawfully
admitted to the United States who was returning from a temporary
visit abroad.58 This second category of immigrant is similar to
that for which the visa requirement was waived in section 21 1(b)
of the 1952 Act. Indeed, section 13(b) of the 1924 Act also
exempted this class from the necessity of presenting an immigrant
visa upon each arrival. 54  Initially, commuting workers were clas-
sified as nonimmigrant visitors for business or pleasure under
section 3(2) of the Act.55 Since nonimmigrant visas were not
required of Mexican and Canadian citizens, commuters entering
from these countries needed no documentation at all.
56  Most of
these aliens, however, continued to obtain border crossing cards
so as to expedite their entry.57  Soon, workers from quota coun-
tries began to use this waiver as a loophole through which they
could enter the United States from Mexico or Canada.5 8  By liv-
ing in the foreign contiguous country, and entering the United
States daily as temporary visitors for business, these aliens were
able to defeat the labor safeguards intended by the quota limita-
tions on immigration.
In response to this problem, -the Bureau of Immigration at
Washington issued General Order No. 8 6, 5 in which it declared
50. Immigration Act of 1924, § 3, 43 STAT. 153.
51. ld., § 4, 13 STAT. 155.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id., § 13(b), 43 STAT. 162.
55. Id., § 3(2), 43 STAT. 154.
56. Hearings to Clarify the Law Relating to the Temporary Admission of
Aliens to the United States Before the Senate Committee on Immigration, 70th
Congress, 2d Sess., at 42 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Clarification Hearings].
57. The Immigration Rules of March 1, 1927, provide in Rule 3, para. 1:
With a view to avoiding delays and embarrassment in cases of aliens and
citizens, who residing upon either side of the line, habitually cross and
recross the boundary upon legitimate pursuits, an identification card will
be furnished such persons upon application to the immigration official
in charge at the place of ingress and egress.
58. Clarification Hearings, supra note 56, at 41-43.
59. Department of Labor, General Order 86 (April 1, 1927), [19271 1
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 494-95 (1942).
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that daily commuters were no longer to be considered temporary
visitors for business, but were instead immigrant aliens. In this
way, daily border crossers were first subject to the quota linita-
tions applicable to their native countries. Once admitted, they
were regarded as permanent United States residents, making tem-
porary visits to Mexico or Canada each time they returned home
to those countries. Since no quota limitations were set for Mexi-
can and Canadian nationals, they could obtain immigrant visas
without difficulty. Upon admission, this national was treated as
a resident immigrant, with no requirement by the Immigration
Service that he actually take up residence in the United States. 0
Due to the impracticality of the daily commuter obtaining the re-
quired documentation for each of his trips across the border, and
because of the conclusion by the Immigration Service that Con-
gress had not intended the end of the commuter practice,6 ' these
commuters were not required to present the immigrant visas or
reentry permits prescribed by the Act of 1924. Instead, the Im-
migration officials authorized the use by the daily commuter of
the 1917-type border crossing card that he had previously used
as a nonimmigrant visitor for business.
62
Shortly after its promulgation, General Order No. 86 was
challenged by two alien laborers from quota countries seeking ad-
mission from Canada as nonimmigrant temporary visitors for
business. The Supreme Court, in Karnuth v. United States ex rel.
Albro,6 3 affirmed the validity of General Order No. 86, basing its
decision primarily on the reasoning that the inclusion of temporary
laborers in the class of immigrants was consistent with the Con-
gressional policy of protecting American labor.6 4 The court in
Karnuth did not specifically mention the propriety of permitting
commuters to enter with border crossing cards once they had been
admitted for permanent residence. Nevertheless, the Immigra-
tion Service has for forty years relied upon the notion that the
court was upholding the entire regulation.65
60. Id.
61. HOUSE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITrEE No. 1, STUDY ON
POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS, ADMINISTRATIVE PRESENTATIONS: AD-
MISSION OF ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES FOR TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND
"COMMUTER WORKERS", PART II: THE MEXICAN FARM LABOR PROBLEM, at 27
(Special Series No. 11, 1963).
62. Immigration Rules of 1930, Rule 3 (Q), para. 1.
63. 279 U.S. 231 (1929).
64. Id., at 243.
65. Brief for Appellees at 10-11, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
Vol. 5
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In 1952, the immigration, nationality, and naturalization laws
were revised and codified into the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.66 This legislation added the new nonimmigrant cate-
gory, section 101 (a) (15) (H) (ii), which the Bustos court found
applicable to seasonal commuters. As shown in the discus-
sion of the appellant's argument, this section classifies temporary
laborers coming into this country as being nonimmigrants.
The government contended in Bustos, however, that com-
muter aliens are properly classed as special immigrants within sec-
tion 101(a)(27)(B) of the 1952 Act.67 This legislation defined
the term non-quota immigrant as an immigrant lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit
abroad. By viewing the commuter's entry into the United States
as a return from a temporary visit abroad, the Immigration Serv-
ice has frequently employed this section to justify its admission
of daily and seasonal commuters without immigrant visas.6
Thle 1952 Act also heralded the beginning of the labor cer-
tification process of section 212(a)(14). In addition, the defini-
tion of residence was supplied in 101(a)(33), and provision was
made in section 211(b) for the waiver of the immigrant visa for
otherwise admissible aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence who depart from the United States temporarily.
In 1960, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia decided the first major case involving the 1952 Act.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Rogers69 involved a suit by a labor
organization against the Attorney General and the Commissioner
of Immigration, demanding that the labor certification process of
section 212(a)(14) be applied not only to non-quota aliens seek-
ing permanent residence, but also -to immigrants who had pre-
viously been admitted for permanent residence. Further, Amal-
gamated contended that even if aliens lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence were not subject to exclusion by a negative la-
bor certification, this exemption was not intended to embrace
alien commuters residing outside the United States. The court's
1973); Petitioner's Brief at 47, Saxbe v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., March
22, 1974).
66. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 163.
67. Brief for Appellees at 21, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Petitioner's Brief at 18, Saxbe v. Bustos, No. 73-300 (U.S. Sup. Ct., March
22, 1974).
68. Brief for Appellees at 26, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
69. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960).
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finding in Amalgamated was two-fold: First, the labor certifica-
tion process of section 212(a)(14) is not applicable to aliens law-
fully admitted for permanent residence.7 0  Second, -the court con-
cluded that it is impossible for nonresident commuters to be
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 71 Hence, com-
muting workers were excludible by the Secretary of Labor's find-
ing that there were sufficient domestic laborers in this country.
The court characterized its opinion in the following manner:
To do otherwise would be to permit administrative practice
,to make a shambles of a provision (212(a)(14)) which, with
Section 101(a)(15)(H), was newly designed by the 1952
Act in order to assure "strong safeguards for American la-
bor."7
2
This portion of the Amalgamated decision was later rejected
in Gooch v. Clark,7 a 1967 case involving an action by resident
farm workers in California seeking an order that government offi-
cials deny admission to alien commuters. The resident farm
workers in Gooch argued that commuting farm workers were non-
residents coming temporarily to the United States to perform tem-
porary labor. As such, they would be considered nonimmigrants
under section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) of the 1952 Act. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this appeal
on the reasoning that section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii) was intended
not to exclude commuters, but rather its purpose was:
[T]o confer nonimmigrant status on certain aliens who were
needed in the American labor force but who, unlike commut-
ers, would be unable to achieve admittance under immigrant
status.
74
Second, the court concluded that commuters are lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence, thus overturning the decision
reached in Amalgamated. Third, the court found ,that the 1965
Amendment to section 211 (b) of the Act of 1952 did not termi-
nate the commuter system. This amendment changed the old lan-
guage of the section so that only returning resident immigrants,
as defined in section 101(a)(27)(B), could enter without immi-
grant visas or reentry permits. Formerly, section 211(b) had
exempted otherwise admissible aliens lawfully admitted for per-
70. Id., at 118.
71. Id., at 118-19.
72. Id., at 119 (footnotes omitted).
73. Gooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970); cert, denied, 402 U.S. 995,
74. Id., at 78.
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manent residence who depart from the United States temporarily.
The 1965 Amendment, as delineated in section 101(a)(27)(B),
was limited to an immigrant lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence who is returning from a temporary visit abroad. Thus, the
only difference between the 1952 Act and the 1965 Amendment
to section 211(b) was limited to the contrast between an immi-
grant who departs from the United States temporarily, and one
returning from a temporary visit abroad. The Gooch court found
this change insignificant, and held that the 1965 Amendment was
not intended to terminate the commuter system. 5 So, the court
gave its approval to the practice of the Immigration Service
whereby commuting workers are allowed to reenter the United
States using their green cards as documentation.
Also in 1965, the Congress had amended section 212(a)
(14) so as to reverse the burden of initiating the labor certification
process.76 Under this new provision, an alien laborer cannot en-
ter the United States unless the Secretary of Labor has certified
that there are not sufficient domestic workers to perform such la-
bor and that his employment would not adversely affect the wages
of American laborers similarly situated. The court in Gooch,
however, found that since commuters were lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, the certification process applied only to
their initial entrance into the United States.
77
Two years later, in 1967, the Immigration Service issued a
new regulation to prevent commuters from acting as strikebreak-
ers. 8 C.F.R. 211.1 (b) (1) provides the following rule:
When the Secretary of Labor determines and announces that
a labor dispute involving a work stoppage or layoff of employ-
ees is in progress at a named place of employment, Form
1-151 [green card] shall be invalid when presented in lieu
of an immigrant visa or reentry permit by an alien who has
departed for and seeks reentry from any foreign place and
who, prior to his departure or during his temporary absence
abroad has in any manner entered into an arrangement to re-
turn -to the United States for the primary purpose, or seeks
reentry with the intention, of accepting employment at the
place where the Secretary of Labor has determined that a la-
bor dispute exists, or of continuing employment which com-
75. Id., at 81-82.
76. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(14), as amended,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
77. 433 F.2d 74, 81 (9th Cir. 1970).
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menced at such place subsequent to the date of the Secretary
of Labor's determination.78
Although this regulation could be a valuable weapon to ex-
clude the daily and seasonal commuters, its impact is weakened con-
siderably by the difficulty in proving the commuters intent at the
time of his entry. It was probably for this reason that the court
in Bustos did not discuss the appellants' claim that the govern-
ment was allowing commuters to enter this country in violation
of the purpose of the regulation.
Finally, in 1968, quota limitations on immigration from Mex-
ico and Canada passed by Congress in 1965 became effective.
79
It was .against this historical background that the Bustos court
gave its approval to the Immigration Service's administration of
the daily commuter system.
II. ANALYSIS: THE DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In its decision, the court stated that the Immigration Serv-
ice's practice of classifying seasonal commuters as returning resi-
dent aliens is in violation of the clear language of the statute."
The Supreme Court has made it clear that an administrative prac-
tice, however long continued and consistently applied by succes-
sive administrative officers, must yield to the language of the legis-
lation."' For this reason, it is difficult to understand the distinc-
tion drawn 'by -the court in Bustos between daily and seasonal
commuters. First, neither daily nor seasonal commuters have an
unrelinquished domicile in the United States. As discussed, un-
der sections 211(a) and 211(b) of the 1965 Amendments, only
returning resident immigrants are exempt from the requirement
that immigrants obtain either an immigrant visa or reentry permit
prior to coming into the United States." Further, 8 C.F.R. 211.1
(b)(1) limits the waiver of immigrant visas to persons returning
to an unrelinquished lawful permanent residence in the United
States. Thus, the plain language of the law dictates that a daily
commuter obtain a visa or reentry permit for each work day. Use
of the green card (1-151) by the daily commuter is simply not
within the statutory scheme. Since no immigrant visa may be ob-
78. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1972).
79. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, § 21(e), 79 STAT. 921.
80. 481 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
81. Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 (1904).
82. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 211(a), (b), as amended,
8 U.S.C. § 1181(a), (b) (1970).
Vol. 5
17
Geile: Bustos v. Mitchell (Saxbe v. Bustos): The Dilemma of Commuting Al
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1974
COMMUTING ALIEN LABoRERs
tained without a prior positive labor certification by the Secretary
of Labor,8 daily commuters who are unable to receive this certi-
fication should be denied entrance into this country. The court
maintained that the concept of residence can be expanded to in-
clude the daily commuter's place of work,"4 yet it offered no au-
thorities outside of the decision in the Gooch"5 case in support
of this contention. To the contrary, the citations presented to
demonstrate the seasonal commuter's lack of residency are equally
convincing when applied to the daily commuter. Section 101(a)
(33) of the 1952 Act defines a person's residence as ". . . his
principal, actual dwelling place without regard to intent."
Clearly, an individual who maintains his only home in Mexico, and
who returns there each day after work, is a resident of Mexico.
The court's labeling of the daily commuters as returning resident
immigrants is, therefore, without statutory support.
Second, daily commuters should not be considered to be non-
quota immigrants exempt from the labor certification process.
section 101 (a) (27) (B) limits this class to immigrants lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, who are returning from a tem-
porary visit abroad. It would be a novel argument indeed to say
that each entry by the commuter on his way to his employment
in the United States is a return from a temporary visit abroad. If
the language is strained when applied to the seasonal commuter,
it is similarly misapplied to the daily commuter.
III. CONCLUSION
The perversion of the language of the statutes by the Court
of Appeals in Bustos so as to spare the daily commuter system
seems to be largely due to the continued practice by immigration
authorities of allowing these workers to enter without visas or re-
entry permits. In addition great weight was given to the fact Con-
gress took no positive action to end this practice." This position
ignores the fact -that neither administrative practice nor congres-
sional accession to that practice will overcome the plain language
of a statute. Tacit congressional approval of administrative or ju-
dicial interpretation cannot change the meaning of a clear federal
statute.
87
83. Id., § 212(a)(14), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
84. 481 F.2d 479, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
85. 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970).
86. 481 F.2d 479, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938).
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The government asked that the court exercise its discretion
and refrain from adjudicating the legality of the commuter sys-
tem."' The court attempted to do so with respect to the daily
commuter practice, stating that "efforts to change or eliminate
such a practice should be addressed to the Congress, not to the
Courts."8 9  The court could have exercised this discretion by
finding that the commuter system was not blatantly repugnant to
the immigration laws. When it concluded, however, that the stat-
utes were distorted when used as a basis for the admission of the
seasonal commuter, it made the daily commuter practice vulner-
able to a similar attack.
The court's decision that the seasonal commuter system is
not the product of long administrative practice is seemingly cor-
rect. As stated in the opinion, 90 the seasonal commuter was given
life only when the Immigration Board of Appeals altered certain
requirements to allow the entry of ex-braceros as seasonal work-
ers.9
1
The long duration of the daily commuter program, however,
should not be allowed to overshadow the gross statutory deviations
necessary to insure its existence. Congress should act to eradicate
either the practice or the ambiguities in the statutes. There are
indications that it will do so soon.92 For the present, to be consist-
ent with the language of the statute, the Supreme Court should
extend the decision of the Court of Appeals in Bustos and should
enjoin the daily commuter practice.
Robert T. Geile
88. Brief for Appellees at 34, Bustos v. Mitchell, 481 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
89. 481 F.2d 479, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
90. Id., at 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
91. In 1965, the Immigration Board of Appeals changed the requirement
that an alien commuter have a permanent and stable job in this country to the
words "regular and stable" employment and interpreted that phrase loosely to al-
low the entrance of seasonal commuters. Matter of Bailey, 11 I. & N. Dec. 466
(1965).
92. Various bills attempting to change the commuter practice have been in-
troduced in Congress in recent years. However, none of these bills has yet re-
ceived a favorable committee report. See, e.g., S. 1373, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
Sess. (1971); S.1488, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 8746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 14831, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971); S. 2643, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); H.R. 980, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3870, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
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